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The aim of this paper is to analyze, using a hierarchical linear model, the degree to which a 
system of choice, as the one implemented in Chile since the beginning of the 80’s, can 
promote student achievement and equity in the social distribution of achievement. Using 
data from a standardized achievement test, which includes the entire population of 4
th grade 
students and schools of the country, we investigate the association between students’ 
socioeconomic status and achievement, within and between schools. We also investigate up 
to what extent different categories of schools enjoy advantages in educating low-income 
students. These are important issues because unlike the limited vouchers programs in the 
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 1 
Introduction 
A school choice system exists when governments make payments directly to families that 
permit them to select the school, private or public, of their choice. These payments can be 
made directly to the family or indirectly to the school of their choice. The purposes are to 
increase parental choice, to promote school competition and to allow low income family 
access to private schools.  
 
In an ideal world, all parents would sort themselves into different schools based on their 
preferences, creating the conditions for the development of effective school communities, 
which would in turn deliver a high quality education. However, in practice the issue of 
stratification cannot be put aside lightly. In fact, it represents one of the central issues in the 
debate over school choice. 
 
This argument almost always carries class and/or race considerations. If more educated 
parents are the ones that demand more from schools, then choice may lead to stratification, 
concentrating the children of parents with the best education and the highest socioeconomic 
status (SES) in a few schools, and leaving those from lower socioeconomic backgrounds in 
the worst schools (Henig, 1994; Levin, 1998; Ladd, 2002; Ladd and Fiske, 2001; Berry et 
al, 2000; Hsieh and Urquiola, 2002).  
 
Beginning in the early 1980s, far-reaching reforms were implemented in the Chilean 
educational system, involving the decentralization of the public school system and the 
handing over of school administration to local government authorities. The reforms also 
instituted public financing of private schools through a per-student subsidy mechanism. The 
per-student subsidy, which is equal value for public and private schools, is intended to 
cover running costs and, at the same time, generate competition among schools to attract 
and retain students
1, thereby promoting more efficient, better quality educational services
2. 
                                                      
1 This is a voucher-type system in which funds are allocated to the school according to their enrollment i.e. 
according to parents’ choices.  
2 This reform also introduced standardized achievement tests; however, test results were only made public in 
1995. 2 
A key policy outcome was the creation of a system characterized by three types of schools: 
fee-paying private schools that operate on the basis of fees paid by parents, which represent 
9.5 percent of the enrollment of children and young people; private subsidized schools 
financed by the per-student subsidy provided by the state, but privately owned and 
operated, which account for 33.4 percent of enrollment; and municipal (public) schools 
financed through the per-student subsidy and run by municipalities, which make up 55.6 
percent of the enrollment
3. 
 
Fee-paying private schools, which have always existed, do not compete with public 
schools, as their fee is, on average, about five times the per-student subsidy. Private 
subsidized schools may also be financed by contributions from parents (shared financing), a 
practice instituted in the mid-1990s. 
 
A number of studies have examined the results obtained by Chilean schools. In general, 
they all conclude that families’ socioeconomic characteristics are statistically significant to 
explain student performance in the different types of schools. When the performance of 
public and private schools is compared, the studies vary because of the tests considered 
(year and grade), the size of the school samples, and the methodology used to evaluate 
school performance
4.  All these studies used traditional econometrics models (OLS with or 
without Heckman correction) that do not consider the multilevel structure of the data and 
do not differentiate between and within school effects.  
 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the degree to which a nation-wide school choice 
program, as the one implemented in Chile since the beginning of the 1980’s, can promote 
student achievement and equity in the social distribution of achievement
5. More 
specifically, we use the results from a standardized achievement test to answer the 
                                                      
3 The three types of schools together account for 98.5 percent of all enrollments. The remaining 1.5 percent of 
school children attend are run by educational corporations linked to business organizations.  
4 See Rodríguez (1988); Aedo and Larrañaga (1994); Aedo (1997); McEwan and Carnoy (2000); Mizala and 
Romaguera (2000, 2001); Bravo, Contreras, and Sanhueza (1999); Tokman (2002); Sapelli and Vial (2001); 
Gallego (2002), Hsieh and Urquiola (2002).  
5 The Chilean case is interesting because unlike the limited vouchers programs in the US, Chile has had a 
nation-wide school choice program for more than 20 years. West (1997), Patrinos (1999) and Gauri and 
Vadwa (2003) review school choice experiences around the world. 3 
following questions: (i) Do some type of schools (public, private subsidized and private fee 
paying) have higher mean achievement than others? Do some kinds of school demonstrate 
advantages in educating low-income students? (ii) What is the association between 
students’ SES and achievement by school type? What school characteristics predict the 
within school relationship between SES and achievement? and (iii) Are there differences 
between the students-level effects and compositional or contextual effects among the three 
types of schools?
 6.  
 
To answer the above questions, related to how organizations affect the individuals within 
them, we use a hierarchical linear model (HLM). In this case we use a two-level HLM, at 
the first level the units are students (within-school model), and each student’s outcome is 
represented as a function of a set of individual characteristics. At the second level the units 
are schools (between-school model). The regression coefficients in the level-1 model for 
each school are conceived as outcome variables that are hypothesized to depend on specific 
school characteristics. 
 
This methodology explicitly recognizes the clustering of students within schools and allows 
simultaneous consideration of the effects of school factors, not only on average school 
achievement but also on structural relationships within schools. An example of a structural 
relationship within a school is the association between students’ socioeconomic level and 
students’ achievement, i.e., the equity in the social distribution of achievement. The 
strength of this relationship may vary from school to school and this variation can be 
explained on the basis of the schools’ characteristics.  The HLM model permits a separation 
of within-school from between-school phenomena, and allows the decomposition of 
students-level effects and compositional or contextual effects (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992; 
Seitzer, 1995, Raudenbush and Bryk, 1986).  
 
Moreover, the use of HLM makes it possible to approach the conceptual and technical 
problems that arise when working with multilevel data: (i) aggregation biases, which result 
                                                      
6 Compositional effects occur when the aggregate of a person-level characteristic is related to the outcome 
even after controlling for the effect of the individual characteristic. 4 
from variables that have different meanings at the different levels at which the data are 
generated; (ii) misestimated standard errors, which reflect the failure to take into account 
the dependence among students responses within the same school; and (iii) heterogeneity of 
regression, which occurs when the relationships between individual characteristics and 




Our analysis is based on the standardized math test applied to 4th grade students in 1999 
and the survey of parents applied at the same time of the test, in order to collect 
socioeconomic data from the students. This test is applied nationally and includes the entire 
population of 4,949 schools and 226,860 students
7. 
 
First, we partition the variance in the SIMCE test results into its within and between-
schools components by estimating a one-way ANOVA with random effects
8. Twenty nine 
percent of the variance in the SIMCE mathematics test results is between- schools
9. 
Second, we estimate the within school (level-1) HLM model as
10:  
 
Yij = β0 + β1 SESij + β2 hours of studyij + β3 failij + β4 preschoolij + rij (1) 
 
Where Yij  is the test result of student i who attends school j, rij is a level-1 random effect 
rij~N(0, σ
2), in which σ
2 represents the residual variance at level 1. 
 
                                                      
7 The test and the survey are administered by SIMCE (Sistema Nacional de Medición de la Calidad de la 
Educación) Tables A1 to A5 in the appendix show descriptive statistics for the student and school-level data, 
for all the schools, and for each of the three school-types. 
8 This is a fully unconditional model, it involves no level-1 (students) or level 2 (schools) predictors. 
9  The between-school variance, τ, is 663.04. The within-school variance, σ
2  (1864.11), is adjusted for 
reliability (0.866) because this part of the total variance in the SIMCE test results also includes measurement 
error (which is captured by the reliability estimate in HLM), see Bryk and Raudenbush (1992). 
10 The variables included in level 1 are the only ones available at the student-level; in particular we can’t use 
previous test results for the same students because they have taken only one standardized test. 5 
This model aims to explain how students’ mathematics achievement is influenced by their 
socioeconomic status (SES)
11, the number of hours they study at home, a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if they have failed a grade and a dummy variable equal to 1 if they have had 
preschool education. The inclusion of the grade-failed variable is intended to control for 
students’ ability
12. Since our focus is the relationships of students’ SES to achievement, this 
variable and the intercept were allowed to vary among schools, while the other variables 
are assumed to be the same fixed value for each school (level 2 units). Table 1 shows the 
results. 
 
Each student characteristic is significantly related to math achievement. The test score is 
positively and significantly related with the student’s socioeconomic status (SES), the 
amount of hours he/she studies at home and attendance to preschool education. However, if 
the student has failed a grade his/her score in the test is lower, once we control for the other 
variables included in the model. 
 
Table 1 
Within-school HLM model. 4
th grade mathematics achievement. 
( N = 226,860 students in 4,949 schools) 
 
Fixed effects 
Variable  Coefficient Standard  error 
Intercept 245.390  0.460** 
Students’ SES    12.472  0.150** 
Hours of study at home     0.988  0.030** 
Failed a grade  -18.518  0.320** 
Preschool education     3.257  0.374** 
 
Random Effects  Variance 
component  df Chi-squared  Reliability 
Intercept     293.514  4919 22551.428**  0.615 
SES Slope      12.080  4919    5944.109**  0.093 
Level-1 effects  1753.299       
** Statistically significant at 1% 
 
                                                      
11 The student SES was obtained using factorial analysis with a weighted average for the variables mother’s 
education, father’s education and family income. These data were obtained from a household survey of 
children taking the SIMCE test. The student SES is a variable with zero mean and standard deviation equal 1. 6 
Chi-square tests of the HLM parameters indicate significant variability among schools in 
both the average achievement and the SES-achievement slope. We can conclude that 
average educational achievement and its distribution among students of different SES vary 
significantly among schools, even when other student characteristics are taken into account. 
 
A full HLM model is estimated to explore the effects of student and school socioeconomic 
status on educational results. The within-model is the same as equation (1); in the between-
school model (2), the variation in the adjusted mean mathematics achievement and the 
SES-achievement relationship is explained as a function of school characteristics; the 
residual parameter variance for hours of study at home, grade failure and preschool 
education attendance are set at zero, i.e. they do not vary between schools.  
 
We estimate three school-level models; in the first model the adjusted mean math 
achievement is explained by the type of school (public, private subsidized (PS) and private 
fee paying (PFP)) and the interactions of the school SES with the school type
13,  the 
students’ SES-achievement slope is only explained by the school type. We differentiate by 
school type to test whether the socioeconomic level has a differentiating effect on the three 
different school types existing in the country. 
 
Between-school model (level-2) 
 
βo = γ00 + γ01 PS + γ01 PFP + γ03 school SESj  x PUBLIC +  γ04 school SESj  x PS +   
        γ05 school SESjx PFP +  µj 0          (2) 
β1 = γ10 + γ11  PS +    γ12 PFP + µj1 
β2 =  γ20 
β3  = γ30 
β4 = γ40 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
12 The variables students’ SES and hours of study at home are centered on their grand means. 
13 The variable school SES is obtained as the average of the students’ SES for each school. The average 
school SES is –0.188 and the standard deviation is 0.87, see table A2 in the appendix. 7 
where γ00, γ01… γ40 are level-2 coefficients and µj0 and µj1 are level-2 random effects assumed to 
multivariate normally distributed with mean 0 and variance τqq and covariance τqq’ between  any two 
random effects q and q’. 
 
The second between-school model incorporates more school characteristics in order to 
explain the adjusted schools mean math achievement; the rest of the model stays the same. 
The variables included are: dummy for urban schools, dummy schools for girls only, 
dummy schools for boys only, dummy full day schools, teachers’ years of experience, 
student-teacher ratio, natural log of the number of students enrolled in the school, 
percentage of students with similar achievement in the school
14.  
 
The third between-school model incorporates the following additional variables to explain 
the SES-achievement slope: school SES, percentage of students with similar achievement 
in the school, percentage of students with similar socioeconomic level in the school
15. 
 
The three specifications show very robust results.  Once a correction has been made for the 
effect of SES in model 1 and other school characteristics in models 2 and 3, estimations of 
fixed effects show significant differences in the average scores of the different school types. 
Private fee-paying schools have higher mathematics mean achievement than subsidized 
private schools and these in turn have higher achievement scores than public schools. We 
conclude that higher SES schools tend to have high math achievement scores; also, and 
very important for the purpose of this paper, the effect of SES on achievement is different 
in the three types of school. The effect of SES on the school’s mean math achievement is 
greatest in private subsidized schools, followed by municipal and then private fee-paying 
schools.  
 
The SES-achievement slope (β1) regression shows that within-school achievement slopes 
are flatter for private fee-paying than for private subsidized and public schools. Thus 
                                                      
14 This variable intends to capture an achievement peer effect. It is measured as the percentage of students in 
the school obtaining mathematics test scores within the range given by the mean school achievement plus or 
minus 0.5 standard deviation. 8 
private fee-paying schools have a weaker association between students’ SES and 
achievement than private subsidized schools and the latter demonstrate weaker association 
than public schools. Moreover, these differences persist when we control for school’s SES 
and the percentage of students with similar scores on the standardized test (model 3), which 
measures the degree of homogeneity among students by ability. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
15  This variable intends to capture a socioeconomic peer effect. It is measured as the percentage of students in 
the school with SES within the range given by the mean school SES plus or minus 0.5 standard deviation. 9 
Table 2 
Full HLM model of mathematics achievement, 4
th grade, 1999. Fixed effects 
(N = 4,949 schools) 
  
Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
For intercept βo 
(adjusted school mean achievement) 





































































     



















School  SES    1.417** 
(0.356) 
% students similar achievement      -13.053** 
(2.027) 
% students similar SES      -2.269 
(1.416) 
     


















Standard errors in parenthesis, ** statistically significant at 1%, * statistically significant at 5%. 10 
Table 3 
Full HLM model of mathematics achievement, 4
th grade, 1999. Random effects  
(N= 4,949 schools) 
 
Random Effects  Variance 
component  df Chi-squared
1  Reliability 
Model 1         
Intercept     193.820 4914  17067.882**  0.553 
SES Slope      14.850  4917    5672.278**  0.110 
Level-1 effects  1752.961       
Model 2        
Intercept   182.874  4906  16477.856**  0.543 
SES Slope     15.525  4917    5671.307**  0.114 
Level-1 effects  1752.717       
Model 3        
Intercept     186.238 4906  16.479.205**  0.546 
SES Slope      14.088  4914    5.540.033**  0.106 
Level-1 effects  1752.159       
Note 1: Chi-square statistics are based on 4,920 of 4,949 schools. 
              ** statistically significant at 1%, 
 
Another way to disentangle the effects of student-level and school-level SES on student 
outcomes is to calculate for model 1 and 2 the within-school (student-level) relationship 
between SES and math achievement (βw), the between-school SES-achievement 
relationship (βb) and the compositional effects (βc)
.17. The compositional effect is the extent 
to which the magnitude of the school-level relationship differs from the student-level effect. 
This effect occurs when the aggregate of a student-level characteristic (SES in this case) is 
related to achievement, even after controlling for the effect of the individual characteristic. 
Table 4 presents student-level, school-level and compositional effects for models 1 and 2, 






                                                      
.  
17 Given that SES is centered on the grand mean the compositional effect is estimated directly and βb is 
derived by simple addition of βc and βw, see Bryk and Raudenbush (1992). 11 
Table 4 
Student-level, school-level and compositional SES-achievement effects 
 
  Between schools 
effects 
βb 
Within schools effects 
βw 
Compositional effects 
 βc  


































  5.938 
(0.467) 
  9.529 
(1.392) 
All the effects (βs) are statistically significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 
As noted previously, the relationship between SES and achievement is weaker within a 
typical private fee-paying school than it is within the typical private subsidized or public 
school; the difference in βw for private subsidized and public schools, although statistically 
significant, is small (table 4). Figure 1 shows the within-schools effects for model 2
18 where 
the relationship between students’ socioeconomic level and math achievement is displayed 
for private fee-paying, private subsidized and public schools. The graph uses the actual 
students’ SES for each type of school; for this reason the line representing students from 
private fee-paying schools fades at low students’ SES, while the opposite occurs with 
public schools which do not have high SES students. 
                                                      
18 These within-school differences are based on a model that includes control variables at the within-school 
and at the between-school level. 12 
 
Figure 1 also shows differences in the three types of schools by mean student achievement. 
Students of low, medium and high-SES obtain better educational results in private fee-
paying than in private subsidized or public schools. Moreover there is a significant 
achievement gap between students in private fee-paying schools and the rest. Students in 
private subsidized schools do better than students in public schools, although the 
achievement difference is small and the gap tends to disappear for high-SES students.  
 
The between-school SES-achievement relationship (βb), i.e. when the school is the unit of 
analysis, shows a different behavior than the within-school one. Overall the relationship 
between school SES and achievement is stronger than the SES-achievement relationships 
within schools, showing that a school’s social-class composition has a substantial effect on 
math achievement, greater even than individual student-level effects (table 4).  
 
Moreover, the strength of the SES-achievement relationship for the different school types 
changes compared with the student-levels. Private fee-paying schools still show the 
PFP





















weakest between-schools SES-achievement relationship, followed by public schools; 
private subsidized schools have the steepest slope between these two variables (table 4). 
Figure 2 shows between-schools effects for model 2; the graph is built using the actual 
school-SES data. It is important to note that private fee-paying schools have a very 
different social-class composition than public schools, while private subsidized schools 
have a broader social class composition and, more resemble public than to private fee-
paying schools. Indeed, the degree of social class homogeneity among a specific school 
type explains the strength of the relationship between school-SES and achievement. The 
lowest impact of social class on achievement is to be found in more homogeneous private 
fee-paying schools, followed by the public schools and finally private subsidized schools 
which are more heterogeneous with respect to social-class composition.  
 
 




































Public schools with low social-class composition, it should be noted, have better mean 
math achievement than public subsidized schools with a similar social-class composition; 
this relationship is inverted for schools of higher social class composition. Thus, public 
schools have advantages in educating low-income students
19. Moreover, private subsidized 
schools, with the same social class composition, tend to have better educational results than 
private fee-paying schools
20. In the small range where public and private fee-paying 
schools have a similar social class composition, the private fee-paying schools have better 
average math test scores.  
 
The compositional effects (βc) are larger for private subsidized schools than for public and 
private fee-paying schools (table 4). These effects are open to several interpretations; one 
possible interpretation is that the higher values represent peer-group effects that influence 





HLM is a powerful tool that permits a separation of within-school from between–school 
phenomena together with the simultaneous consideration of the effects of school factors not 
only on school mean achievement but also on the structural relationships within schools. 
This methodology allows us to enrich the analysis of the Chilean case, not only on the 
relative performance of public and private schools, but also on the relationship between 
SES and achievement for different school types. 
 
The within-school analysis shows us that there are large and significant differences in 
achievement and equity between private fee-paying schools and the other two types of 
schools. Private fee-paying schools have significantly higher math mean achievement and 
are more equitable in the social distribution of achievement than private subsidized and 
                                                      
19 Tokman (2002) using a different methodology (OLS) and only the school average results obtains a similar 
conclusion from the 4
th grade SIMCE test of 1996. 
20 This result is obtained after including control variables at the within-school and the between-school level in 
the model. 
21 They  may also reflect the fact that average school SES acts as a proxy of  variables omitted from the 
model, mainly schools’ resources, Bryk and Raudenbush (1992). 15 
public schools. At the within-school level, public and private subsidized schools have a 
similar behavior.  
 
The between-school analysis shows us a more complex picture; first, there is high social 
class stratification between private fee-paying and public schools, only the private 
subsidized sector includes schools with broader range of social-class composition. It is 
important to note that private subsidized schools, created as a result of Chile’s voucher 
system, have not “specialized” in a specific socioeconomic group but provide educational 
services to broad representation of the population. This result does not support the claim of 
school choice critics that the new schools will concentrate children of parents with high 
socioeconomic status. 
 
Second, the between-school SES-achievement relationship is more equitable for public and 
private fee-paying schools than for private subsidized schools, probably because among 
private fee-paying and among public schools there is less socioeconomic differentiation. 
Third, public schools with a low social-class student composition are more effective than 
private subsidized schools with a similar student base; that is, public schools demonstrate 
advantages in educating low-income students. However, this relationship is reversed for 
schools of higher social-class composition. Also, we can conclude, comparing the two 
kinds of private schools, that some private subsidized schools with high social composition 
are more effective than private fee-paying schools.  
 
We conclude that the SES-achievement relationship between schools is stronger than the 
SES-achievement relationship within schools, that is, the social-class composition of the 
school has a substantial effect on mean achievement, even larger than the individual 
student-level effect.  
 
This finding implies a selection explanation in which the difference in the SES-
achievement relationship is a result of differences between school types in the process by 
which students are assigned to schools.  Here it should be noted that the regulations for 
admitting and expelling students differ between public and private schools. While public 16 
schools must admit all their applicants (as long as there are vacancies) and have serious 
restrictions for expelling students, private subsidized and private fee-paying schools are 
free to establish their own admission and expulsion policies.  
 
Further, the amount of resources available to schools strongly differs: for while public 
schools are mainly financed by the uniform voucher per pupil provided by the state, private 
subsidized schools can also be financed by parents’ contributions (shared financing), and 
the fees of private fee paying schools are, on average, about five times the per-student 
subsidy. 
 
Given the demonstrated importance of socioeconomic factors on achievement both within 
and between-schools, it is important that the design of a voucher system considers an 
equalizing voucher, i.e., an income dependent subsidy per student
22. This will  take into 
account that it is more expensive to educate low-income students because the school has to 
compensate their socioeconomic disadvantages.  
                                                      
22 Many authors suggest an income dependent voucher to reduce the inequality of educational expenditures; 
Epple and Romano (1998), Gauri and Vadwa (2003), Bearse et al (2000), among others. 17 
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 N  Minimum Maximum  Mean  Std.  Deviation
SIMCE math test scores  281468 111 396 250.02  49.99
Students SES  238047 -2.271 4.287 0  1.000
Hours of study at home  251135 1 13 4.85  3.29
Failed a grade  296299 0 1 .11  .32
Preeschool education  296299 0 1 .78  .41




School-level data: All schools 
 
 N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std.  Deviation
Total Enrollment  5457 158.25 353.86 246.180  28.559
Private fee-paying schools  5457 0 1 .09  .29
Private Subsidized schools  5457 0 1 .33  .47
Public schools  5457 0 1 .58  .49
Urban schools  5453 0 1 .67  .47
Teachers -years of experience  5050 .00 41.00 15.620  6.457
Full day school  5454 0 1 .39  .49
Girls schools  5447 0 1 .043  .20
Boys schools  5447 0 1 .028  .17
Student/teacher ratio  5009 .750 2019.000 34.088  48.276
Ln enrollment  5452 .000 6.286 3.632  .928
School SES  5398 -1.934 3.307 -.188  .870
% students with similar SES  5398 .000 1.000 .418  .166
% students with similar achievement  5457 .000 1.000 .377  .116





School-level data: Private subsidized schools 
 
 N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std.  Deviation
Total enrollment  1779 158.25 326.29 250.692  26.980
Urban school  1777 0 1 .85  .35
Teacher - years of experience  1580 .00 41.00 11.338  6.258
Full day school  1777 0 1 .32  .47
Girls schools  1773 0 1 0.068  .25
Boys schools  1773 0 1 0.042  .20
Student/teacher ratio  1560 1.333 2019.000 42.253  62.832
Ln enrollment  1777 1.609 6.286 3.794  .835
School SES  1751 -1.934 2.399 -. 031  .617
% student with similar SES  1751 .0000 1.000 .434  .147
% students with similar achievement  1779 .0000 1.000 .383  .102




School-level data: Public schools 
 
 N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std.  Deviation
Total enrollment  3186 162.00 353.86 236.398  22.119
Urban schools  3185 0 1 .52  .50
Teacher – years of experience  3096 .00 30.00 18.407  4.907
Full day school  3185 0 1 .40  .49
Girls schools  3185 0 1 .017  .13
Boys schools  3185 0 1 .010  .10
Student/teacher ratio  3090 .750 1128.000 30.623  40.595
Ln enrollment  3184 .000 5.835 3.546  .994
School SES  3156 -1.823 1.098 -.598  .413
% Student with similar SES  3156 .000 1.000 .424  .178
% Students with similar achievement  3186 .000 1.000 .368  .124
Number of observations  3061  
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Table A5 
School-level data: Private fee-paying schools 
 
 N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std.  Deviation
Total enrollment  496 208.92 345.12 292.978  18.612
Urban schools  495 0 1 .98  .15
Teacher – years of experience  378 .00 32.90 10.712  5.672
Full day school  496 0 1 .50  .50
Girls schools  493 0 1 .12  .32
Boys schools  493 0 1 .093  .29
Student/teacher ratio  363 3.000 337.500 28.452  27.527
Ln enrollment  495 1.609 5.545 3.610  .706
School SES  495 -.480 3.307 1.873  .643
% Student with similar SES  495 .000 .833 .329  .112
% Students with similar achievement  496 .105 .778 .417  .098
Number of observations  362  
 
 